The Warfare Doctrine Of The Superpower Revealed

The armed wagon, in the conception of States you Increase precedent to the second world war, it was a tool of support for the weapons of infantry and cavalry: then it didn't hold him necessary for the wagons a mobility tactical and strategic superior to these. Particularly the military thought divided since that time the wagons in "heavy wagons", from infantry, and "wagons cruisers" or fast wagons, from cavalry. This distinction, that reflected a fundamental lack of understanding, was particularly strong in the French military environments and English. Besides. further serious strategic error. the wagons were framed in battalions within the divisions of infantry e/o cavalry, therefore it was the commander of those unities that decided when and as to use them.

The heavy wagon was projected to fight the hostile infantry, it was heavily armored, slow and armed with machine guns and guns of small caliber. Beside the cavalry and of the heavy wagons you/they had to operate the wagons cruisers, framed in dependent regiments by the bodies of army, with functions exploring and of exploitation of the success: these were very faster, but carenti both in the protection and in the armament.

Among the end of the years '20 and the beginning of the years '30, a concept that had been successful in France in the last months of the first world war taking back and that you/he/she had brought to the birth of the Renault FT-17, many small armed (as the Vickers from 6 tons, model Mk An and B) wagons were planned, commercialized for the export. These wagons were divided in "wagons machine gun" (with 2-3 or more weapons than small caliber) and "wagons gun" (with a piece generally from 37-40mm, accompanied or less from 1-2 machine guns); you/they had been conceived for fighting in groups that mutual help had to be lent. The wagons gun they intervened against the other wagons, the wagons machine guns intervened against the infantry. If forced to operate alone these wagons, whose corazzatura was very thin generally, you/they were easily overpowered, besides a "wagon gun" it was almost entirely incapable to efficiently hock the infantry, because the gun of which was provided it was too much of small and deprived caliber of fragmentation brooms.

In conclusion, to halves the thirties, the armed wagons were not able to hock similar vehicles in fight. Only then in Great Britain there realized the error and him it started, too late, to constitute divisions armored experimental to allow the wagons to operate according to the theories of Fuller, also keeping on maintaining to operational level the division among wagons "from infantry" and wagons "cruisers." In France he/she was preferred to submit him to the Line Maginot instead rather than to a mobile defense, with tragic consequences few years later.