The Debut Of The T-34 On The Russian Front

To the beginning of the operation Barbarossa (the German attack to the Soviet union), the troops of the Wehrmacht rarely met it: also, in those sporadic occasions, he succeeded in throwing the Germanic carristis and their officers in a paroxysmal discouragement, next almost to the panic. Heinz Guderian, the organizer of the departments armored German, as well as realizzatore of the theory of programmatic use of the Panzers in battle, in front of the innovative characteristics of the mean, that made it superior to every mean of the Wehrmacht it came to suggest that the German engineers directly copied it.

In reality the Russian wagon had many defects: its tracks were fragile, the turret was also defended poorly against the smaller calibers of the weapons anti-wagon, its transmission - in the first years of the conflict - it was the most primitive of its times, the gun of the last models it was so long that extended to get silted up and therefore to explode when used.despite this, the T-34 began to form the principal component of the unities armored Soviet during 1942, when the factories that built it, evacuate in all hurry from Ukraine and from Russia Bianca (you threaten from the German advance) they were reconstructed to the sure one behind the Uralis, taking back to full strength their productive rhythms.

The Soviet Theory On Tank Use Secret Revealed

The theories of employment in Soviet Union initially heard again some current conceptions, so much that the Soviet wagons in the years winds were or extremely light or colossuses with two or more turrets, practically incapable of movement.

Nevertheless the marshal Tucha.evskij, treasuring the collaboration with the Reichswehr, it developed his based theories of employment of the armed wagons on a concept for the times revolutionary: the battle in depth (what, in the eighties, it will be the theoretical base for the Airland Battle 2000 in the United States).

Considering that the future of the battles was in the strengths' penetration mechanized in depth in the hostile device, they had to entirely be build great unities battleships, whose employment had to substantially foresee operations of trickery of the front (obviously Tucha.evskij had in mind the ample level spaces of Russia: an operation of the kind would have been very more difficulty in Central Europe). This involved a narrow collaboration among armored strengths and tactical aviation, is in operation of interdiction of the hostile lines of restocking, is in operation of the strengths' contrast armored hostile.

In the conception of Tuchacevskij the armored departments had to have both departments of infantry that of wagons, supported by a thick quantity of mechanized artillery and wagon-artillery. The wagons had to be type middle and it was considered fundamental the mobility, the possibility to engage both hostile wagons and (above all) departments of infantry. Particular importance was given to the autonomy, to the reliability of the tracks and the systems of transmission, to the train of reliable rolling also in cold environments, muddy, sandy or innevati. Close to the middle wagons they served heavy wagons thought, unlike the heavy wagons in study in Germany (means exclusively anti wagon) as wagons endowed with a powerful person artillery of support. Tuchacevskij and his collaborators debated then whether to build or less some great heavy wagons from staving in, usable only to break the hostile lines and left together with the infantry, between them idea was set aside, to be proposed then after 1937 with "monsters" pluritorretta. The armed wagons over that against the armored troops and the hostile trenches as fundamental means were thought for surprising to the sides the centers of command, the airports, the points of passage forced, the streets of communication and the fords, the arsenals and the polverieres hostile, penetrating in depth in way coordinated with a light (mechanized in theory, but in the experiments of the years '20-'30 he continued to also use departments climbed on to horse) infantry, parachutists (also thinking about building some airports over the hostile lines) and aerial restocking.

In the 1937 Tucha.evskij you/he/she was shot, for order of Stalin, together with almost all his collaborators and all the officers that didn't originate from his "gang of the turns" in the great purgations. However the projects for the wagons that he had developed (exploiting, among the other, the mechanical intuitions of Christie, fundamental for mobility and speed) continued their development. In 1941 USSR had available the wagons developed on the base of the theories of employment of Tucha.evskij: the heavy wagon KV 1 and the middle wagon T -34. Besides the Soviet theories insisted a lot on the big caliber of the guns of the wagons, with pieces notably more powerful persons (at least in the role of support of artillery) of those German, French and British.

To the eve of the war USSR was endowed with the best and more reliable wagons armed with the world. These however you/they had been impoverished after the purgations since not inclusive to full; the radio had for example been removed by the T-34s, anticipated in the first project, and they had been abolished the armored (you replace with the brigades) divisions, besides they missed the good official carristi, also because many veterans of the war of Spain had been eliminated in the purgations that followed him in the slow years'30. The armed wagon was tied up to the infantry, used as a strength of artillery of mobile support, role that (also anticipated also from the Soviet reformers of the years '20-'30 unlike theirs homologous German) was enormously limitative for the abilities of mobility and fight anti wagon of the Ts -34.

The British theories Of Engagements And The Development Of The Tanks In Germany

The theories of Fuller founded him on the development of the tactic of German infantry developed during the first world war by the German Greatest State, that foresaw an use of the infantry to create local staving in, which had to immediately be exploit, before the arrival on the spot of the reserves.

This tactic had shown its validity at least in three battles, conducted under very different conditions among them, but always with these principles well in mind: Line (1917), Caporetto (1917), Marna (1918). These canons of employment had been studied by Fuller and Liddel Hart, that had proposed a tactic call "of the river in flood", based on analogous principles.

The appearance of the armed wagon had pushed the two researchers to move their attention on the new mean, that perfectly integrated him to the theory already developed, and you/they had pointed out the consequent formalities of employment of the new weapon, that could reassume him in the followings precepts:

the armed wagons had to have employed in mass, therefore you/they had to be frames in homogeneous divisions constituted in prevalence of solos armed wagons (armored divisions);
since the wagons had to operate in collaboration with the other weapons (particularly infantry and artillery) the integrated shares of these last in the armored division you/they had to have the same mobility of the wagons;
the function of the armored divisions had to not be tactical, but strategic.
These ideas, diverging from those of States Increases, they didn't have fortune neither in Great Britain and so much less in France, but who assimilated her and on these it founded the development of the armored weapon it was Germany.

The essay of Versailles had prohibited the possession of armed wagons to Germany, allowing only her to hold a limited number of in operation autoblindo of public order, nevertheless, under the impulse of the general von Seeckt, the Reichswehr started to develop to the foreign countries that armaments that were forbidden from the essay, therefore the newborn used USSR as partner for the development of the Panzers (this was the German name of the armed wagons, abbreviation of the official Panzerkampfwagen that is vehicle armored by fight), that made of the German a military school near Kazan available.'

In parallel it organized a series of field manoeuvres, in which the armed wagons were simulated with civil tractors to the purpose to understand better the use on the field of the new means. Shortly after the retirement of Seekt the Republic of Weimar was ended, and to its place the Third Reich had been born, whose chancellor was Adolf Hitler.

Besides German instructors were found in Bolivia to command the small contingent of tankette and armed wagons Vickers from six tons, during the war of the Chaco between 1932 and 1935, drawing some important conclusions of it:
the capocarro has only to command the mean, and not to load guns or to manage other assignments,
the corazzatura must withstand the weapons of the infantry, and you/he/she must be formed from settled special steels or fused so that is not detached splinters if you/he/she is struck,
the tactic of best fire is that in which a wagon moves him from a shelter to the other, shooting lock with the protected or hidden hull,
the tracks must be very ample (to reduce the pressure to the ground, therefore to allow the wagon to stir on all the grounds) and rather resistant (for not scingolare next to the hostile postings),
the light wagon is little profit, it needs to focus on a middle wagon,
it doesn't have sense use mixed formations of wagons machine gun and wagons gun, the armed wagon it must be able to use both the weapons, endowed with ample munizionamento
the armed wagons must always be used in mass.
In the 1935 Hitler has reported the essay of Versailles, and from that moment it began the real development of the armored weapon. Under the push of the general Guderian, theoretical of the new doctrine German carrista in his book Achtung Panzer!, the production of two types of light (armed with machine gun) wagon was initiated, and of two types of middle (armed with howitzer) wagon. Particularly interesting they were the two middle (PzKpfw III and PzKpfw IV) wagons, that united a good mobility and an enough corazzatura to an armament that, also still hearing again some conceptions of the wagon as support of the infantry, it had notable potentialities for a future development.

Other experiences, after those of the Chaco, they were served as officers and German soldiers intervened in the Spanish civil war. The formulation given by the conflict of the Chaco was confirmed, even if at that time Germany produced for the more light wagons it needed to pass to the middle wagons, little importance they had those heavy, while it was being begun to see with favor the possibility to use the wagons as instead it arms anti wagon of excellence, armed with guns to high speed.

In October 1935 three Panzerdivisionens (armored divisions) were constituted and in 1937 five Leichtedivisionens (light divisions) were built, with a good relationship between wagons and infantry. These divisions in 1939 against Poland and in 1940 against France showed what they were able the wagons in the blitzkrieg (literally "war lightning", generally translated "war lightning").
Particularly, analyzing the country of France (1940) it is seen that German superiority was not neither in the number neither in the quality of the wagons (the Armèe was superior as number and quality of the means), but in the best doctrine of employment of the wagons and in the organic divisional (perhaps the most neglected
jaw of the military art) that set the new tool in the hands of young officers and endowed with ample discretion, that could use such means to the best.

The Warfare Doctrine Of The Superpower Revealed

The armed wagon, in the conception of States you Increase precedent to the second world war, it was a tool of support for the weapons of infantry and cavalry: then it didn't hold him necessary for the wagons a mobility tactical and strategic superior to these. Particularly the military thought divided since that time the wagons in "heavy wagons", from infantry, and "wagons cruisers" or fast wagons, from cavalry. This distinction, that reflected a fundamental lack of understanding, was particularly strong in the French military environments and English. Besides. further serious strategic error. the wagons were framed in battalions within the divisions of infantry e/o cavalry, therefore it was the commander of those unities that decided when and as to use them.

The heavy wagon was projected to fight the hostile infantry, it was heavily armored, slow and armed with machine guns and guns of small caliber. Beside the cavalry and of the heavy wagons you/they had to operate the wagons cruisers, framed in dependent regiments by the bodies of army, with functions exploring and of exploitation of the success: these were very faster, but carenti both in the protection and in the armament.

Among the end of the years '20 and the beginning of the years '30, a concept that had been successful in France in the last months of the first world war taking back and that you/he/she had brought to the birth of the Renault FT-17, many small armed (as the Vickers from 6 tons, model Mk An and B) wagons were planned, commercialized for the export. These wagons were divided in "wagons machine gun" (with 2-3 or more weapons than small caliber) and "wagons gun" (with a piece generally from 37-40mm, accompanied or less from 1-2 machine guns); you/they had been conceived for fighting in groups that mutual help had to be lent. The wagons gun they intervened against the other wagons, the wagons machine guns intervened against the infantry. If forced to operate alone these wagons, whose corazzatura was very thin generally, you/they were easily overpowered, besides a "wagon gun" it was almost entirely incapable to efficiently hock the infantry, because the gun of which was provided it was too much of small and deprived caliber of fragmentation brooms.

In conclusion, to halves the thirties, the armed wagons were not able to hock similar vehicles in fight. Only then in Great Britain there realized the error and him it started, too late, to constitute divisions armored experimental to allow the wagons to operate according to the theories of Fuller, also keeping on maintaining to operational level the division among wagons "from infantry" and wagons "cruisers." In France he/she was preferred to submit him to the Line Maginot instead rather than to a mobile defense, with tragic consequences few years later.

The Development Of The Doctrine Of Employment Of The Armed Wagon

Just ended the first world war the defeated ones they were destroyed, and the winners were exhausted both from the moral point of view and from the financial point of view. For this in the following months immediately to the war the enormous armies that had fought were demobilized and the expenses for the armaments were drastically reduced. Despite the a little favorable climate, some theoretical ones, English, kept above all on studying the armed wagon more as system of weapons that as technical entity.

Particularly these studies were brought ahead from the colonel Fuller and from the captain Liddell Hart in Great Britain, from the colonels Estienne and De Gaulle in France.
This whole intellectual fervor, that brought also to a theoretical development of the extremely advanced employment of the wagons, it didn't practically have comparisons in the military doctrine of States Maggiori British and French, that always considered the armed wagon as a weapon of support of the infantry or the cavalry, while in the United States practically the studies on the wagons arrested him up to 1936, apart some developed projects as initiative deprived by Christie, that the modern system of suspensions of the wheels developed tracks of great diameter, adopted above all by the Soviets in the wagons BT and from the English from the second world war in then.

In Italy the doctrine of employment of the armed (and, therefore, the relative development) wagons was conditioned from the geographical particularities of the peninsula, particularly the mountainous (on which the greatest part of the battles of the first world war you/they were developed) ground pushed to the development of light wagons so much that the first valid middle wagon appeared only after the beginning of the second world war. To deepen the matter is postponed to the specific (Vehicles armored Italian) voice.

General Characteristics Of The Wagons Armed With The First World War

The armed wagons used in the First world war were the first vehicles of the kind to appear on the battlegrounds, therefore they were totally innovative. You almost immediately manifested a differentiation between heavy (conceived for sustaining the infantry, therefore that they moved to the same footstep of the infantrymen) wagons and light (essentially destined to the exploitation of the success, therefore endowed with a comparable speed with that of the cavalry) wagons. Generally the motor was to gasoline (100-150 HP for the British or German wagons and 35-90 HP for the French wagons), the corazzatura, of varying thickness among 6 and 30 mm for the heavy wagons, it was spiked and the system of suspensions was almost absent using winding tracks or suspensions for tractor. The armament was in short beards, that is in side casematte, but already in 1917 the first wagons appeared with armament in rotating turret (Renault FT -17). The standard caliber of the principal armament for the heavy wagons was of 57.75 mm, while the light wagons were armed with guns of smaller caliber or machine guns.

The Employment Of The Armed Wagon In The First World War

September 15 th 1916, with the crews not trained still, 32 wagons were envoys against the German trenches, within the battle of the Sums. Contrarily to the opinion, not only of the experts, but also of the French allies, the British Greatest State didn't want to wait for to have an enough number of wagons to use them in mass. After few meters from the bases of departure the 50% of the wagons had been destroyed, and also those that arrived on the hostile trenches, despite the terror that they induced in the German infantries, thing that a great number of the normal one of prisoners provoked, didn't succeed in getting decisive results.
Meanwhile the French Greatest State was planning other models of armed wagon, among which also one with a rotating turret (the Renault FT -17), while the German Greatest State put in the yard one project of his for an armed wagon, with a more architecture similar to the British models. This wagon took the name A7V, from it initials her/it of the special (secret) committee installed for studying the problem.
However, before the German armed wagon was usable (17 December 1917), the armed wagon had shown its tactical value in the battle of Cambrai. In this battle, for the first time, the armed wagons were used in mass, attaching on November 20 with 400 wagons on a front of 8 km. The attack was not preceded by the usual bombardment of artillery, and taken therefore of surprised the German commands, that you/they saw to sprout from a smoke curtain the graceless outlines of the wagons, that terrorized the infantries, followed by the English infantrymen that completed the work.

This battle taught to the commands military European two things: what the wagons had to have employed in considerable number and that the infantry had to cooperate with the wagons; in the succession of the battle of Cambrai the defenders succeeded in restoring only the line of defense after having isolated the wagons from the hostile (the wagons owed stay on the objectives waiting for the infantry, that also arrived with delays of three hours towards the wagons) infantry. The commanders of the divisions, arrived after the infantry, they decided that the hostile fire was excessive and they gave the order to the wagons to refold. The battle extended him for other six days, but by now a clash of infantries and artilleries you/he/she had become: the wagons had opened the breach, but this had not been exploited.

By now it was clear that the armed wagons were a fundamental component for the war effort of the agreement, and up to the end of the war it were developed on the field the new doctrines of employment. In the meantime also the German had sent their wagons to the front, and April 24 th 1918 happened the first clash among wagons armed with the history, during the second battle of Villers-Bretonneux.
The origin of the clash was a typical battle of meeting, in fact the German command had organized an attack finalized only to bring the road knot of Villers-Bretonneux under the draught of the artillery and, missing of infantry, you/he/she had sent 15 wagons A7V to support of the infantry.

A group of 3 German armed wagons met a group of Tank Mk IV English of which a solo furnished of guns, this immediately hocked the enemy destroying well soon a German wagon with a draught from 350 ms, while the others two were hidden from the fog. The other two wagons withdrew him before reaching contact with the enemy. It was the first time that an armed wagon was destroyed by another armed wagon. In the pursuance of the fight, when they were busy also the other German wagons, also the British suffered losses.

The armed wagon was not employed during the first world war on the Italian front, considering that the front was primarily of mountain. The only present armed wagons in Italy at the end of the war were 7 Renault FT-17 to Verona, used for the training.

The solution of the agreement for the Tank

The study of the armed wagon was initiated, under the push of the Primo Lord of the admiralty (Minister of the Marina Militare) sir Winston Churchill, from the Royal Navy, under the name of coverage of "Project Tank" ("Reservoir") and still today in the countries of Anglo-Saxon or Slavic language the armed wagon is known note as tank.

The preceding experiences with the autoblindos had shown that the wheels were not proper for the movement on the ground upset by the fire of artillery, therefore been immediately decided to equip the new mean with tracks, and indeed the first prototypes seemed some big reservoirs wound by tracks. Well soon the British army began the collaboration to the project with the Marina.

Already in 1915 he arrived to a first project of motto: winding tracks, motor Daimler from 105 hp, speed in plain of 6,5 km / h, armament on two machine guns or a machine gun and a gun from 2 pounds (40 mm). It stayed opened the problem of the choice of the tracks and the suspensions.

The final project produced a vehicle to form of rhombus with winding tracks and two short beards to the sides of which they went out or two machine guns or a machine gun and a gun from 6 pounds (57 mm), the corazzatura had a thickness of 10 mm. This mean had called Big Mother ("Big Mother") and stirred for the first time on its tracks on January 16 1916. They were orderly 100 vehicles on the base of this project (Tank Mk The) and to August (always 1916) it was delivered the first vehicle to the crew.

The Tactical Problem Of The Tank

Thin from the first months of the first world war it was evident that the tactical problem to be resolved, once that the war of movement and the armies that was ended they had jammed on a system of trenches long hundreds of kilometers, it was that to overcome the joining boned machine gun-thread.

These two means, together with the ground upset by the preparations of artillery, they prevented the infantry the advance in mass on the hostile trenches and, also acknowledged to get a local victory to fully exploit the success.

Both the agreement and the Central Empires tried to give an answer to this problem, particularly after the huge slaughter of the battle of Verdun (1916).


While the answer of the Empires (and particularly of the German) to this problem was substantially to tactical level, modifying the formalities of employment of the infantry, the agreement looked for instead of developing a weapon that was not busy from the machine guns and they could easily overcome the boned thread, also on the tormented ground of the battlegrounds. The German solution brought to the development of the light machine gun, that of the agreement to the development of the armed wagon.

Tanks Origins Revealed

Since the beginnings of the XX century some researchers were set the problem of the motorized movement on the battleground, even if, up to the first world war nobody had almost understood what the true tactical problem would have been produced by trench - boned thread - machine gun.

Particularly some ideas (only on paper, more literary than techniques) were express at the English writer H.G. Wells, in the description of his "armored tortoise." Who faced instead the problem from the technical point of view it was the lieutenant of the Austrian Imperial army Günther Burstyn, that prepared a project and a model for the Motorgeschütz, a vehicle armored that it moved on tracks and it had the principal armament in rotating turret.

Nevertheless neither the literary hypotheses neither the technical projects convinced States you Increase some necessity of similar vehicles.

The Concept Of The Tank

The armed wagon is a terrestrial fight vehicle, this military middle typology was used on the battleground for the first time in the Sums, during the imposing Allied offensive during the first world war.

The principal characteristics of an armed (what they distinguish it from the other fight vehicles) wagon are:

Traction on tracks
Presence of armament offensive action to hock hostile targets
Enough Armoured to withstand the fire of heavy weapons
Among the various typologies of present fight vehicles in the various armies, only the fight (Main Battle Tank) Wagons and the light wagons can be considered correctly armed wagons.
Tank of the first WW1 video watch it and enjoy it: